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Trial-Type Ceremonies 
and Defendant Behavior 
"Moralizing" and "Cooling In" 
in an Eviction Setting* 
Richard O. Lempert~- 
This study uses hearing transcripts to examine judge-defendant interaction in a trial-type setting. The set- 
ting is a public housing eviction hearing; judges are eviction board members and defendants are tenants fac- 
ing eviction for non-payment of rent. All tenants in the sample were formally evicted, but in each case the 
execution of the eviction order was stayed on the condition that the tenant pay his rent. Two forms of verbal 
interaction are identified. The first, "moralizing" is deemed present when one or more board members 
directs a degrading remark toward the tenant. The second, "cooling in" is deemed present when one or 
more board members directs a helping remark toward the tenant and the tenant in some way indicates his 
receptivity. When moralizing occurs the eviction hearing contains all of Garfinkel's (1956) requisites for 
successful status degradation ceremonies. Consequently it was hypothesized that tenants who had been 
moralized would be less successful in clearing their rent debts than tenants who had not been moralized, but 
if successful, more likely get into rent payment trouble again. It was also hypothesized that tenants who had 
been "cooled in" would be more likely to clear their rent debt than tenants who had not been cooled and 
that, having cleared their rent debt, they would be less likely to recidivate. All predictions except the 
hypothesized association between cooling in and recidivism are supported by the data. Although cell sizes 
grow uncomfortably small, the predicted relations persist after controlling for obvious sources of 
spuriousness. The conclusion discusses the analogy between the housing eviction hearing and the criminal 
trial. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies reveal that attitudes which judges manifest toward accused 
individuals vary with the alleged crime (Mileski, 1971), the characteristics of the ac- 
cused (Emerson, 1969), and the personality of the judge (Wheeler et al., 1968). We 
*I would like to thank Bliss Cartwright, Theodore Newcomb, Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and Stant~ Wheeler for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Work on this article was supported by Cook Funds 
of the University of Michigan Law School. In writing an earlier version I benefited from a Russell Sage 
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know that judges sometimes treat defendants harshly, sometimes sympathetically, 
and sometimes in a neutral bureaucratic manner. However, we have little empirically 
based knowledge about the effects which different styles of judicial treatment have on 
those receiving them? 
This study does not investigate the relationship between judicial and defendant 
behavior in the criminal justice setting, but it does report data on such relationships in 
a trial-type setting bearing substantial resemblance to the courtroom encounter. This 
setting is the public-housing eviction hearing. 
To anticipate briefly, in the jurisdiction studied a tenant brought before the evic- 
tion board for nonpayment of rent almost always receives a "suspended sentence"; 
that is eviction is ordered but the execution of the order is stayed on the condition that 
the tenant repay his rent debt. It appears from the data that the quality of the interac- 
tion between board members and tenants has a significant impact on the probability 
that the tenant will be able to pay his rent debt and avoid future rent payment 
problems. Where the board members suggest that a tenant has been morally culpable 
in failing to pay his rent - -  a stance I call moralizing - -  the tenant is less likely to pay 
the rent owing and, if he does pay, he is likely to fall behind in his rent at some future 
date. Where the board members advise the tenant on how to deal with his problems or 
otherwise try to help him, the tenant is particularly likely to repay his rent and avoid 
eviction. I call this helpful stance "cooling in," a neologism which suggests itself 
because the process is typically the opposite of that which Goffman (1952) has termed 
"cooling out." In cooling out people are encouraged to discard valued statuses; in 
cooling in people are encouraged to remain in statuses they are about to leave. I shall 
say more about the meaning of cooling in when I discuss the process in the context of 
the eviction proceeding. 
This brief glimpse into what the data show has, no doubt, left the critical reader 
anticipating a spurious relationship. One would expect those tenants who are most 
likely to repay their rent regardless of board treatment to evoke a more helpful and 
less hostile stance than those tenants who are likely to fail to repay their rent 
regardless of treatment. This does not appear to be the case with these data. If it is not 
the case, this study may be important as identifying two effects of judge-defendant in- 
teraction with substantial theoretical and practical significance. 
A. The Setting 
Beginning in December 1957, tenants in the jurisdiction studied were given the 
right to an eviction hearing when the housing authority wished to expel them. For two 
years these hearings were held before a board of three authority officials; later they 
were held before a board of five laypersons. 2 At all times the hearings intentionally 
1I am talking here only about the informal aspects of the interaction between judge and defendant; not 
about such formal treatment as differential sentencing. I am concerned with interaction which occurs in 
trials or trial-type hearings. "Trial-type hearing" is a lawyer's term of art that refers to administrative 
hearings that generally follow the due process model of the judicial trial. While the essentials of due 
process apply in trial-type hearings, procedures are often more relaxed than in judicial trials as are the 
rules of evidence, and the judges may be relatively informed about the matter in dispute with a clear com- 
mitment to promoting agency policy. 
2About 10% of the cases analyzed arose before the board of authority officials. The theory being tested 
does not depend on the composition of the board, and the results presented do not change when composi- 
tion is controlled. 
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followed a judicial model. Tenants were subpoenaed to appear and testimony was un- 
der oath; throughout much of the period the authority had a representative who 
directly examined authority witnesses; and tenants could cross-examine opposing 
witnesses, call their own witnesses, and tell their stories under oath. Like the defen- 
dant in a criminal trial the tenant was the focus of court attention. But, the "court" 
was typically less concerned with whether a violation had occurred (this was usually 
undisputed) than with the reasons why it had occurred and the prospects it would oc- 
cur again. Unlike a judicial hearing, counsel was absent, the spirit and setting were in- 
tended to be informal, and the "judges" often actively questioned the tenant and 
witnesses. 
Transcripts available for the first five years of board hearings and sporadically 
thereafter provide a basis for characterizing the way in which the board members 
treated tenants before them. The performance of nonpayment tenants, not im- 
mediately evicted, provides an objective measure of treatment effects. The eviction 
board typically voted eviction of tenants behind on their rent but deferred execution of 
the order on the condition that the tenant clear up the then current rent debts while 
paying subsequent rent charges as they accrued. In such circumstances three outcomes 
were possible: the tenant might clear the rent debt and never again fall behind, the ten- 
ant might clear the rent debt and after a period of time recidivate, or the tenant might 
fail to repay the debt and be evicted within a few weeks or months of the hearing. In- 
formation on outcomes was retrievable from the authority's files. 
B. Moralizing and Cooling In 
Transcripts were read, and two kinds of board treatment were coded. The first 
kind of treatment is called moralizing. Moralizing is said to occur if the tenant was ad- 
dressed during the hearing in language which suggested that he was morally culpable 
or that his actions violated rules which were morally correct. 
The following remarks by the board's chairman are an example of what was con- 
sidered a moralistic stance. 
Chairman: Now, let's realize that, first of all these chain [sic] of events are started by 
yourself, when you become arrears in your rent. You signed a contract when you moved into 
housing to pay your rent on such and such a date each month. To start the thing you reneged 
on your contract and you have a record which is irrefutable of a continuing renege, con- 
tinuaily behind in your rent. You created this poor credit yourself, before we take exception 
to anybody else. Now I wish you would ask your questions with that in mind. Now the things 
that the manager of the housing has done are the routine steps in carrying out the respon- 
sibilities of his position? 
The following dialogue presents a more extreme example: 
Board member: You said it is hard on you. Have you noticed that others have hard times 
too? 
~There are at least two problems with the way moralizing was coded from transcripts. First subjective 
judgments about the thrust of particular language were at times necessary. Second, there is no attempt to 
distinguish cases by the amount and kind of moralizing. Thu, s a sustained attack on the tenant's integrity 
by a number of board members is coded the same way as one remark by one board member which calls the 
tenant's integrity into question. While distinctions might have been made, these would have called for even 
more subjective judgments since no two cases are identical in the amount and kind of moralizing and, 
more importantly, distinctions would have reduced the N's  in some subcategories to such small numbers 
that analysis would have been impossible without recombination. 
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Tenant: Yes sir. 
Board member: You know others have less money and get by? 
Tenant: Yes sir. 
Board member: How could you get in such a hole - -  welfare for two years - -  even an animal 
needs a hole to crawl in. 
The second kind of board treatment shall be called cooling in. The term is not 
current in social science and must be defined. Cooling in may be thought of as the 
process of encouraging an individual to retain or acquire a valued status in a situation 
where the individual appears likely to forfeit, discard, or fail to acquire that status. In 
his well-known article on cooling out, Goffman notes in passing that in certain 
situations it may be necessary to cool individuals in rather than out. He gives the ex- 
ample of an individual who must be made to understand that a promotional change in 
status is voluntary and that the loss of one's previous role in these circumstances is the 
ultimate test of having filled it properly (Goffman, 1952, p. 453). 
The need for this kind of cooling in will be rare since moves to more valued 
statuses usually carry sufficient rewards to motivate actors. More common is the 
situation where the occupant of a particular status appears likely to abandon that 
status for one that is less valued or carries fewer rewards. The prospective change in 
status may be either voluntary or for reasons beyond one's control. In such situations 
a person or an organization may desire to cool the individual back into the status he is 
in the process of discarding. The cooler may be motivated by altruism or self-interest. 
There are a variety of circumstances in which one might be cooled back into a 
status he is discarding. These circumstances will vary with the motivation of the 
cooler, the willfulness with which the status is being discarded, and the cooling 
technique used. The professional football team that rewrites the contract of a star 
quarterback who threatens to retire faces someone who appears willing to discard a 
valued status. Because of the team's needs, monetary incentives are used to cool the 
star into remaining a team member. The marital counselor, trying to cool one spouse 
back into a marital relationship, may be dealing with someone whose tentative deci- 
sion to separate from the other may not be clearly voluntary or involuntary. The 
rewards offered by such cooling agents are typically psychic, while motivations may 
combine altruism and professional self-interest. 
In this study, the targets of cooling in are tenants who may have to forfeit tenant 
status because of their inability to cope with the associated role demand that they 
regularly pay their rent. The cooling agent is the eviction board. Board members 
appear motivated by their desire to help tenants and their concommitant reluctance to 
evict where it is not absolutely necessary. The usual cooling technique is to advise 
tenants how to cope with the exigencies of the tenancy role. The board commonly in- 
forms tenants how to qualify for public welfare, discusses ways to budget income, and 
explains how the manager and project staff might be of assistance. 
Attempts at cooling in; like attempts at cooling out, are not always successful. In 
this study, cooling in was coded as having occurred where the board made some effort 
to advise the tenant on how to cope with his problems and the tenant indicated in some 
way, even if only through a general "thank you" at the end of the hearing, that he was 
receptive to the board's efforts. The following is an example of cooling which came at 
the end of a hearing in which the tenant revealed a diffuse set of problems. 
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Table  1. T r e a t m e n t  Effec ts  For  N o n p a y m e n t  Cases  
Evicted or Total 
Treatment vacated Recidivists a failures b 
Cooling in; 
no moralizing 11% 13% 22% 
(N : 18) (2) (2) (4) 
Cooling in; 
moralizing 16% 50% 58% 
( N =  19) (3) (8) (11) 
No cooling in; 
no moralizing 39% 25% 55% 
(N = 33) (13) (5) (18) 
Moralizing; 
no cooling in 50% 40% 70% 
(N : 20) (10) (4) (14) 
All treatments 3I% 31% 52% 
,(N = 90) (28) (19) (47) 
aThe percent recidivist equals the total number of instances where tenants 
who cleared their cases were later brought back before the board for non- 
payment of rent divided by the total number of cases cleared. 
bPercent total failures equals the total number of deferred tenants evicted 
or vacating plus the total number of recidivists divided by the total number 
of cases for each category. 
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Chairman: What we have done is we have ordered eviction, but since you want to remain we 
will withhold, it if you do certain things . . .  [The conditions of deferral are spelled out.] 
The board has other recommendations, but they are not conditions. Go to John Howard 
or A.A. Work closely with your parole officer, see legal aid about workmen's compensation. 
This pays you when you are sick on the job. [The last recommendation reemphasizes a point 
the board discussed in more detail earlier in the hearing when the tenant suggested that a job- 
related injury - -  for which he had not sought compensation - -  had kept him from work.] The 
moment you fail management will issue an order for eviction. Do you understand, we all try 
to be as fair as possible. 
Tenant: I really appreciate it, thank you. 
There is no logical association between moralizing and cooling in. The eviction 
board may moralize a tenant but not cool him in, cool him in but not moralize him, do 
both, or neither. There are four possible combinations of cooling in and moralizing; I 
shall refer to these as board "treatments." 
C. Basic Relationships 
Table 1 presents the data relating treatment to outcome in nonpayment cases 
deferred by the board. Column one gives the percentage of tenants by treatment who 
fail to clear their rent debts and are evicted? Success in repaying rent is apparently 
4When used in this discussion, the word "evicted" will include cases in which the tenant vacated owing 
money before the manager could report back to the board for a formal eviction order. 
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associated with the presence of cooling in and the absence of moralizing. Only 11% of 
those cooled and not moralized are evicted compared to 50% of those moralized and 
not cooled. Positive effects associated with cooling in appear to be stronger than 
negative effects associated with moralizing; 16% of those cooled and moralized fail to 
repay their rent debt compared to 39% of those neither cooled nor moralized. 
Although the numbers on which this analysis is based are small, the overall associa- 
tion between treatment and outcome is so pronounced that it is unlikely to result from 
chance? However, it may well be that some of the differences within the table, such as 
the difference between the two treatments involving cooling, do result from chance 
factors. 
Column two of Table 1 presents the percent recidivist for each of the four 
treatments. Since only tenants whose cases have been cleared can be recidivists, the 
base for this percentage is the 62 cases which appeared before the board and were 
cleared, not the 90 cases which form the base for the other two columns. The cooling- 
no moralizing treatment again shows the strongest association with successful 
reintegration into the tenancy status, with a 13% recidivism rate. However, the 
relative effectiveness of the other treatments differs from what it was when short-term 
outcomes were examined. The least beneficial treatment for tenants who clear their 
debts is the moralizing and cooling treatment with a 50% recidivism rate. The next 
poorest is moralizing-no cooling with a 40% rate. The recidivism rate for the no 
cooling-no moralizing treatment is 25%. From these data it would appear that the 
presence or absence of moralizing has important effects on recidivism, but that the 
presence or absence of cooling is less important. The numbers on which these per- 
centages are based are so small that one cannot safely discard the hypothesis that the 
apparent differences in treatment effects are due to chance; however, it is instructive 
to proceed with analysis on the assumption that these differences are attributable to 
treatments. 
Column three of Table 1 presents long-term failure rates based upon the assump- 
tion that in the long run recidivism as well as eviction indicates a failure to meet the 
ongoing demands of the tenant status. Treatment effects appear dramatic. Twenty- 
two percent of those treated with cooling and without moralizing fail as compared to 
70% of those subjected to the opposite treatment. Figures for the mixed treatments 
suggest that the absence of cooling or the presence of moralizing has about the same 
SThe chi-square statistic indicates that the association between treatment and outcome reported in column 
one of Table I would occur by chance less than two times in 100. However, because of the small numbers 
involved and other problems with the sample, significant tests shall not be relied upon in analyzing the 
data. The 90 cases examined are not a random sample of all nonpayment cases heard and deferred by the 
eviction board. Cases arising between 1958 and 1962 are overrepresented because transcripts were almost 
always available for these cases but are only sporadically available for cases arising thereafter. There are 
also problems of independence. Once a tenant cleared his rent debt he could enter the sample again by 
once more failing to pay his rent debt and being again threatened with eviction. The data on recidivists in 
Table 1 includes three tenants who are represented twice. The data base for "evictions" and "total 
failures" includes six tenants who are represented twice and two who are represented three times. In this 
analysis each case will be treated as an independent event even if the same tenant is in fact involved. The 
treatment variation between pairs and among triplets of cases involving the same tenant is not noticeably 
different from what one might expect if he chose six pairs and two triplets of cases at random. In addition 
certain control factors such as the amount of rent owed at the subpoena date vary as if the cases were in- 
dependent. 
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degree of detrimental effect in the long run. However, these long-term failure rates are 
ambiguous, because it is not unreasonable to interpret the recidivism component as 
reflecting more upon the short-term success of the various treatments than on their 
long=term failure. 
Nonpayment tenants no doubt differ in the ease with which they may be set 
straight. Some may be facing clearly temporary setbacks or be testing the system, and 
the only help they require may be the proverbial kick in the pants; others may be 
chronically troubled, perpetually wondering where their next rent payment dollar will 
come from. The latter group would be expected to fail in their efforts to repay their 
rent, or, if they somehow managed repayment, to fail in future efforts to keep up. 
Among the chronically troubled, rent repayment, even if followed by recidivism, 
would be a significant and difficult achievement; among the less troubled, it might be 
neither. 
This perspective suggests that a short-term success rate representing the number 
of recidivists for each treatment divided by the total number of evictees and recidivists 
for that treatment would be more meaningful than that given in column one. Short- 
run success rates for these difficult cases are: 
Percent 
Cooling in and no moralizing 50 
(N = 4) 
Cooling in and moralizing 73 
( N =  11) 
No cooling in and no moralizing 28 
(X = 18) 
Moralizing and no cooling in 29 
(N = 14) 
Viewed in this way, the data indicate positive short-term effects for cooling in. There 
is no indication of negative effects associated with moralizing. This approach 
precludes conclusions about long-term effects. 
A model which treats long-term failures as a reflection on the short-term success 
of particular treatments is a priori more plausible than one which treats these failures 
as evidence of long-term effects. The latter model assumes that the treatment which a 
tenant receives in a 30- to 90-minute hearing will affect his or her behavior for as tong 
as two or three years after the hearing. This assumption is intuitively questionable, 
particularly since behavior operationalized as moralizing or cooling in may account 
for but a fraction of tenant-board interaction. 
From the perspective of the short term success model, the over-aU failure rates 
presented in column three of Table 1 are better interpreted as the percent of cases, by 
treatments, involving problem tenants. This interpretation calls the efficacy of what 
appeared to be the most successful treatment, cooling without moralizing, into ques- 
tion. Only 22% of the cases receiving this treatment involve problem tenants so 
defined compared with 55% of the cases in the next lower category. In other words, the 
board chooses to cool in but not moralize those tenant,; who appear likely to clear 
their debts, and moralize but not cool in those "tenants whose repayment prospects 
appear worst. The relative success of the treatments is attributable not to the board's 
treatment of the tenant, but to the different kinds of tenants subjected to the various 
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treatments. Apparent association between treatment and outcome is, in a word, 
spurious. 
D. Controlling for Spuriousness 
To decide empirically whether apparent treatment effects are spurious, it is 
necessary to identify tenants likely to have trouble in repaying their rent and keeping 
up with future rent without begging the question by assuming that short- or long-term 
failure is indicative of chronic inability to cope with the duty to pay rent. Data 
collected from the authority's case records and its tenant files allows the construction 
of five indicators which one would intuitively expect to be associated with rent pay- 
ment problems and which might influence the board's choice of treatment. They are: 
the size of the rent debt, occupational status, the presence of behavior problems, the 
presence of financial problems, and the receipt of welfare aid. One problem with most 
of these control variables is that records were lacking for some tenants, so information 
on some indicators is lacking for a substantial proportion of the cases. 6 
E. Tabular Analysis 
If the relationship between treatment and outcome can be explained by any one 
of the above variables, that relationship should disappear when the appropriate rival 
predictor is controlled for. Table 2 gives the association between treatment and 
clearance rates controlling for each of the five predictors. Cell totals are uncomfort- 
ably small. However, there is little in the data to suggest that the basic relationship 
between treatment and outcome is spurious. Substantial differences between the 
effects of the two extreme treatments, cooling in without moralizing and moralizing 
without cooling in, hold for all categories of all predictors, and the original rank- 
ordering of treatments holds for six of the ten subcategories. 
The data on tenants with rent debts of more than three months and on those with 
no financial problems (columns two and five of Table 2) are particularly interesting. 
Differentials between the success of treatments that vary only on the cooling in dimen- 
sion are less in these subcategories than in any of the eight others. In addition, these 
are the only subcategories in which tenants subjected to neither cooling in nor 
moralizing are more likely to repay their rent than those subjected to both. There is an 
obvious explanation. Cooling in as operationalized occurs where the board advises the 
6For a detailed discussion of the way in which the control variables were operationalized see Lempert 
(1971). Generally variables were dichotomized at a point which maximized explained variance in case out- 
come while still retaining enough cases in each cell for controlled analysis. Some variables were 
trichotomized at the exploratory stage, but these finer breaks did not appear to increase the utility of the 
control variables as rival predictors. Job status is coded according to Duncan's (1961) socioeconomic in- 
dex and welfare aid was coded present only if received during the 3-year period encompassing the hearing 
date. The financial problems index reflects the presence within the living unit of five problems which can 
be expected to adversely affect a family's earning or saving potential: mental illness, severe physical ill- 
ness, abuse of drugs, abuse of alcohol, and the garnishment of wages. Physical illness and garnishment 
were the only problems that were frequently mentioned. The behavior problems index is based on recorded 
lease violations. This includes such activity as shacking up, holding noisy parties, getting into fights, child 
neglect, particularly bad housekeeping, and keeping unauthorized cats or dogs. 
TRIAL-TYPE CEREMONIES 351 
~  








gC ~_g gC s g  ~ 
ca  
= ~  ~ .-~o 





tenant on how to deal with his financial difficulties and the tenant is receptive to this 
advice. Where there are no major financial problems or the rent debt is particularly 
great, cooling in can be expected to be of limited value since the tenant is likely to be 
in a situation where he either has little need for financial advice or where advice alone 
cannot help him. 
Table 3 presents the data on recidivism controlling for the same rival predictors. 
Cell totals are even smaller than in Table 2 which makes conclusions even less certain, 
but generally there is little to suggest that the relationship between treatment and 
recidivism is spurious. Cooling in without moralizing is either alone or ties as the most 
successful treatment for all subcategories of all rival predictors. 7 The no moralizing, 
no cooling treatment is more successful than the two treatments involving moralizing 
in seven of the ten subcategories. In two of the instances where it is less successful than 
treatments involving moralizing (columns four and six), it is not disproportionately 
accorded individuals having the favored status (high job status or no financial 
problems), and the overall association between the variable and recidivism is not in 
the expected direction. The third exception (column seven) involves very small 
numbers. 
F. Summated Scores 
A simple way of summarizing the combined effects of potential rival predictors is 
to give each case a score of one for every variable which predicts to failure. 8 If these 
scores are then summed for each case and the distribution of cases by treatments is 
presented, one should get a rough indication of whether the aggregate effects of the 
rival predictors can explain apparent treatment effects. If the less successful 
treatments tend to be'accorded tenants with higher case scores, it is an indication that 
apparent treatment effects may be explained by the presence or absence of other con- 
ditions. This procedure is complicated somewhat by the missing variable problem. 
This makes the distribution of total scores misleading since a case which has favorable 
characteristics on two of three variables present would score the same as a case which 
scores unfavorably on the only variable present. To correct for this, scores will be 
presented as fractions of the pote.ntial maximum score. Table 4 presents the distribu- 
tion of the cases by treatments and by the three variables most likely to be rival 
7I am aware that the use of a Word like "success" suggests a causal relationship between the treatments and 
outcomes. While this is indeed the hypotheses being tested, the data presented in these tables do not sup- 
port any firm conclusions on this question. All that can be said from the data is that the relationship does 
not appear tO be spurious. I am using terms like "success" only as a short and, I hope, clear way of 
describing the direction of association. 
8Multiple regression, a more sophisticated and generally preferable method of multivariate analysis, was 
attempted, and the results are even more strongly suggestive of treatment effects than the results presented 
in this paper. A presentation of the regression results is not included because it is not clear how meaningful 
these results are given the untenability of the homoscedasticity assuml~tion when a 0-1 dummy variable 
(outcome) is dependent, the small number of cases, and the fact enough predicted "y" scores in the un- 
corrected regression fell outside the range "0-1" to make the two-stage method of correcting for 
homoscedasaticity (Goldberger, 1964) inapplicable. I will be happy to supply the results of an uncorrected 
regression analysis to any interested reader. 
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Table  4, Distr ibut ion  o f  All Cases  by T rea tmen t  and Total  Score  on Three  Rival Predic tors  ~ 
Treatments 
Cooling in Cooling in No cooling in Moralizing 
Fraction of rival and and and and 
predictors predicting no moralizing moralizing no moralizing no cooling in 
eviction (N = 18) (N = 19) (N = 33) (N = 20) 
0/3 - 5.3 3.0 5.0 
0/2 5.6 b 5.3 - - 
0/1 5.6 15.8 12.1 5.0 
1/3 38.9 36.8 15.1 20.0 
1/2 11.1 5.3 3.0 30.0 
2/3 27.8 15.8 42.4 35.0 
1/1 5.6 10.5 3.0 5.0 
2/2 - -  5.3 12.1 - -  
3/3 5.6 - -  9.1 - -  
aThe predictors are rent debt, financial problems, and welfare aid. 
bPercentage of column " N . "  
predictors to initial outcome? These are the rent debt, financial problems, and welfare 
aid variables. Where the denominator of the fraction is one, the score is always based 
on the rent debt variable. Where the denominator is two the score is almost always 
based on the rent debt and financial problems variables. The table is arranged so that 
repayment risk as judged by scores on the rival predictors increases as one reads down 
the columns. 
The figures in Table 4 indicate that the relatively poor repayment record of the no 
cooling-no moralizing treatment may be explained in part by the fact that cases 
receiving this treatment are poorer repayment risks than tenants subjected to the other 
treatments. It is also possible that some of the differences between tenants cooled and 
moralized and those not cooled and moralized may be explained by other factors, 
since tenants receiving the former treatment have a more favorable pattern of scores 
on the rival predictors than tenants receiving the latter treatment. The difference in 
the pattern of scores between tenants cooled but not moralized and those moralized 
but not cooled is not great. Thus, the very different outcomes associated with the ex- 
treme treatments cannot be explained by available rival predictors. 
These results suggest that the presence or absence of moralizing is more impor- 
tant in determining short-term failure than was heretofore indicated. If a correction 
could be made for the characteristics of the tenants subjected to the various 
treatments, the percentage of tenants evicted in the two treatments without moralizing 
would be closer to each other, as would the percentage of tenants evicted in the two 
treatments where tenants are moralized. The presence of cooling in would un- 
doubtedly continue to be related to success in clearing rent debts. 
Table 5 presents the same data for cleared tenants, as these are the only tenants 
who might be recidivist. The scores in Table 5 are based on scores on the financial 
~Rent debt, financial problems, and welfare aid are chosen as predictors because in the unreported regres- 
sion analysis occupational status made no contributions to the explained variance (t value > 0.60) while 
the relation between behavior problems and outcome was not in the predicted direction. 
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Table 5. Distr ibutien of Cleared Cases by Treatment  and Total Score on Three Rival Predictors" 
Treatments 
Cooling in Cooling in No cooling in Moralizing 
Fraction of rival and and and and 
predictors predicting no moralizing moralizing no moralizing no cooling in 
recidivism (N = 15) (N = 12) (N = 18) (N = 9) 
0/3 -- -- 11.1 11,1 
0/2 - 8.3 - - 
0/1 6.7 b - -  - -  - -  
I/3 26.7 16.7 16.7 11.1 
i/2 - 8.3 - - 
2/3 26.7 41.7 38.9 33.3 
1/1 13.3 16.7 16.7 44.4 
2/2 . . . .  
3/3 26.7 8.3 16.7 - -  
aThe predictors are financial problems, welfare aid, and behavior problems. 
bpercentage of column "N."  
problem, welfare aid, and behavior problems predictors? ~ A denominator of one 
usually reflects information about financial problems. Where the denominator of the 
fraction is two, there is usually information on financial problems and welfare aid. 
It does not appear from Table 5 that these predictor variables taken together can 
explain any of the variance in recidivism apparently due to treatment effects. None of 
the treatments appears to be disproportionately associated with cases favored on the 
rival predictors. Thus it appears that the association between moralizing and 
recidivism cannot be explained by the hypothesis that the board tends to be dispropor- 
tionately moralistic towards tenants who are poor risks because they have a history of 
financial problems, behavior problems, and no chance of receiving welfare aid. 
G .  A F i n a l  T e s t  
In discussing the uncontrolled relationships I noted the intuitive implausibility of 
the hypothesis that the treatment received at a hearing would affect behavior two or 
three years thereafter; thus the association between moralizing and recidivism which 
the data revealed was regarded as suspect. More detailed analysis indicates that the 
relationship between moralizing and recidivism persists despite attempts to control 
singly and simultaneously for plausible rival predictors. The early skepticism suggests 
a final test, If effects of moralizing cannot be expected to endure over long periods of 
time, one would predict that the elapsed time between a tenant's initial hearing and 
~~ behavior problems variable was included because it had the highest zero-order relationship with 
recidivism. The rent debt variable was eliminated because its zero-order relationship with recidivism was 
slight. The financial problems indicator was retained despite its slight negative zero-order relationship 
with recidivism because regression analysis on this subsample of cases indicated that when other factors 
were controlled it related more strongly to recidivism in the predicted direction than did the behavior 
problems index, In this subsample the zero-order association between recidivism and financial problems 
was in the predicted direction, although it was not as strong as the zero-order relationship between 
behavior problems and recidivism. 
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the date he is brought before the board again as a recidivist will be shorter for those 
who have been moralized than for those who have not been so treated. 11 The data sup- 
port this prediction. The average elapsed time between the initial hearing and the date 
a tenant is again brought before the board is 21.6 months for seven recidivists who 
were not moralized and 15.4 months for the 12 recidivists who were. Six of seven cases 
reopened within ten months or less of the initial hearing involve tenants who were 
moralized as do ten of 13 cases reopened within 16 months or less. 
II. D I S C U S S I O N  
A. Cooling In 
The presence of short-term effects for cooling in is not very surprising. The 
treated population is one with a specific need for financial assistance and cooling in as 
operationalized involves advice on how such assistance may be procured. Very often, 
however, the tenant has received advice similar to the board's advice from the project 
management staff or from social workers assigned to them. This raises the question of 
why the board's advice is apparently followed when earlier advice was apparently ig- 
nored or useless. 12 It may be that there are features of the eviction hearing which lead 
the tenant to be peculiarly receptive to advice rendered in this context. The quasi- 
judicial setting may be important. This setting is a solemn one and the tenant's finan- 
cial situation is the focus of serious attention. Furthermore there is no history of an- 
tagonism, suspicion, or paternalistic domination to color interaction between board 
and tenant in the way it might affect the tenant-project manager or tenant-social 
worker relationship. The board does have considerable power over the tenant in its 
ability to order evic.tion, but this power is of a specific and limited kind. Advice from 
individuals with restricted ability to intrude on one's affairs may be more palatable 
than similar advice from those claiming authority to interfere more diffusely in one's 
life. 
However, another aspect of the hearing experience probably contributes more to 
the efficacy of the board's cooling attempts than its limited intrusiveness or the other 
11The logic behind this prediction is that tenants could become recidivists for many reasons, one of which is 
the experience of having been moralized. One would expect most factors which lead to eviction to be ran- 
domly distributed over time, but the moralizing factor should affect behavior - -  if it does - -  rather close 
to the time of the hearing. Thus, a group containing some tenants whose recidivism is attributable to 
moralizing and some whose failure is attributable to other factors should on the average recidivate sooner 
than a group consisting only of those whose failure is attributable to factors other than moralizing. 
~The assumption that any earlier advice that the tenant received was ignored or useless is probably a safe 
one because if the advice had helped the tenant overcome existing financial problems he or she would 
probably not have been brought  before the board. The assumption that cooling in works because the 
board's advice is followed is somewhat more tenuous. While it is a reasonable and obvious assumption, 
this study presents no direct evidence on what tenants who are cooled in do to clear their rent debts and 
how, if at all, this differs from the behavior of tenants who are not cooled in. The fact that cooling in 
appears unrelated to success in clearing rent where there are no finatacial problems and where rent debts 
are large suggests that cooling in is effective because tenants follow the advice given, since these are the 
only two of the ten control conditions where advice on how to solve financial problems could be expected 
to be irrelevant or insufficient. 
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factors mentioned above. This is the way in which the board exercises its power. I have 
already noted that the board routinely orders tenants evicted but then defers execution 
of the order on the condition that the tenant repay the accrued rent debt. This 
procedure has three characteristics likely to promote cooling in. The first is that in ex- 
change for deferral the board elicits a promise from the tenant to clear the rent debt 
according to some schedule. Often the tenant's promise will explicitly or implicitly in- 
clude a commitment to seek the kind of help which the board has suggested. Second, 
the deferral procedure makes the threat of immediate eviction upon failure to pay rent 
clear, thus emphasizing both the precarious and the contingent nature of the tenant's 
position. The message seems to register with tenants who, apparently unaware that 
the deferral procedure is routine, react as if they have had a narrow and perhaps lucky 
escape when they learn they are not to be evicted. At the same time they are usually 
told that any failure to meet their rent repayment schedule will result in the execution 
of the defei:red order without any further board appearance. The fact that the tenants 
are contesting the manager's eviction decision indicates that they value their housing 
status, is so the threat that the order may be executed can be expected to provide a 
strong incentive to comply with the board's payment demands. Advice from the board 
as to how these demands may be met may achieve particular salience in these cir- 
cumstances. Finally, the deferral procedure gives the tenant an apparent victory over 
the project manager. The tenant achieves his primary objective - -  avoiding eviction 
while the project manager has his request for immediate eviction formally denied. 
Since hostility between the tenant and manager often exists by the hearing stage, the 
tenant's formal victory may lead to favorable attitudes toward the board and to recep- 
tivity to board advice? 4 
B. Moralizing 
The association between moralizing and adverse outcomes, particularly the 
association between moralizing and recidivism, exhibits the kind of dynamic which 
~Before starting eviction proceedings managers usually send tenants formal notices telling them that they 
must vacate their units for nonpayment of rent. Many tenants leave upon receiving such notices. Those 
who do not leave at this point and who fail to make some effort to clear their rent debt are subpoenaed to 
attend an eviction hearing. Most tenants served with a subpoena will attend the hearing, but some leave 
without taking advantage of their right to appear before the board. 
~4The commencement of an eviction action suggests that there is a strained relationship between the tenant 
and tile manager, since managers almost never bring eviction actions when they feel that they are able to 
"work with" a tenant to develop a program to clear the tenant's rent debt. One might expect that 
managers as insiders and as repeat users of the eviction tribunal would view the hearing process and the 
routine deferral decisions very differently from the tenants, perhaps regarding the decision to defer as a 
kind of "con" in which the tenant is given the feeling of victory in order to promote management's ends. 
But this is not the case. Managers regard the eviction hearing as an adversary process between them and 
the tenants and view decisions to defer as at least temporary "losses." One reason for this is that most 
managers pride themselves on not bringing eviction actions except as a last resort. When the board 
through a decision to defer treats the tenant as potentially salvageable, the managers feel that their 
professional competence is being called into question. This feeling was particularly acute after the com- 
position of the board was changed from a group of housing authority 6fficials to an independent group of 
laypeople. The managers are unaware of the extent to which those deferred by the board succeed in repay- 
ing their back rent. 
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social psychologists in the tradition of Cooley, Mead, and Blumer - -  the symbolic in- 
teractionist school - -  would predict. The board in moralizing expresses its doubt of 
the tenant's ability to meet the role demands associated with tenant status, and the ten- 
ant responds by "living up" to the board's doubt, i.e., failing to repay the rent debt. 
According to the theory one must presume an unmeasured intervening variable, a 
change in the tenant's self-concept, which results from the board's moralizing and 
leads to subsequent failure (Kinch, 1963). 
The symbolic interactionist perspective is supported by experimental evidence 
that negative evaluations will cause people to think less of themselves (Videbeck, 
1960) and will lead them to act in ways which reflect a diminished view of their own 
competence (Webster et al., 1972). There is also evidence that self-concept predicts to 
behavior in nonlaboratory settings (McPartland et al., 1961). Nevertheless, even the 
committed symbolic interactionist might find the association between moralizing and 
recidivism reported in this study surprising. Board-tenant interaction appears too 
brief to cause the kind of fundamental change in self-concept which would endure over 
a substantial length of time and lead to such a significant failure as not paying one's 
rent. Yet if the experience of being moralized contributes to the inability to clear a 
rent debt or to recidivism once the debt is cleared, the effects associated with the hear- 
ing must be powerful indeed. 
For such powerful effects to occur there must be something about the eviction 
hearing which makes it a particularly propitious occasion for the transformation of 
the tenant's identity. An article by Garfinkel (1956) suggests a reason why this might 
be the case. When, but only when, moralizing is present the eviction hearing is 
characterized by all of Garfinkel's requisites for successful status degradation 
ceremonies. 15 It may. be that the seriousness of the setting and the ceremonial trap- 
l~Garfinkel's conditions necessary for successful degradation ceremonies described in language applicable 
to the eviction process are: 
1. The lease violation must appear to be an uncommon occurrence, and the tenant must be seen as 
one who has acted out of the ordinary. 
2. The tenant should be held responsible for the violation without regard to any of the peculiar cir- 
cumstances which led him to violate the lease in the particular manner. The image of the tenant should be 
opposed to the image of the virtuous conformer, and the witnesses must feel compelled to acknowledge 
that action which would not have led to a violation is morally superior to the action which constituted the 
violation. 
3. The denouncer (in the eviction setting this is typically a board member, but in some circumstances 
may be the housing authority's representative), must identify himself to the witnesses as acting as a public 
representative. What he says must be accepted by the witnesses as true because they realize that he and 
they are the same with respect to the issues involved. 
4. The denouncement must be made in the name of community values. 
5. The denouncer must be denouncing the wrong because it violates the community values, not 
because of harm done to him personally. 
6. The denouncer must be seen by the witnesses as one who supports the values. 
7. The denouncer must emphasize the way he, as a supporter of cgmmunity values, differs from the 
tenant and must lead the witnesses to see themselves as differing in the same way. 
8. The tenant must be defined as one outside the legitimate order, as an aberrant person. 
Even without moralizing conditions 1, 4, 5, 6 and parts of 2 and 3 inhere in the structure of the hear- 
ing as it has been described. The subpoena and oath-taking ritual emphasize that lease violations are un- 
usual and that tenant violators are acting in an extraordinary fashion, The moral superiority of conform- 
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pings which pertain lend a force to the board's moralizing (the equivalent of Gar- 
finkel's denouncement) which would not otherwise exist. It may be much more dif- 
ficult to dismiss the implications of a denouncement for one's self when it is rendered 
by authoritative officials in a trial-type ceremony than when it is rendered in less for- 
mal circumstances. 
It should be noted that the expectation that moralizing in the course of an evic- 
tion hearing will have powerful identity-transforming effects follows not directly from 
Garfinkel's exposition of his theory, but by analogy. As presented by Garfinkel, the 
goal of degredation ceremonies is the transformation of the identity of the accused in 
the eyes of those who are witnesses to the ceremony. Such transformation is sufficient 
for degradation because social status is defined by Garfinkel in terms of the way one is 
perceived by those with whom one interacts. 1~ But defining degradation in terms of the 
reaction of witnesses ignores the possibility that a degradation ceremony sufficient to 
convince witnesses of the accused's lowered identity might not be witnessed by in- 
dividuals occupying social positions which enable them to convince relevant others 
that a lowered conception of the accused's identity is appropriate. 
The eviction hearing is such a situation. Witnesses to the ceremony rarely if ever 
enter the tenant's life space again. Garfinkel's exclusive concern with third-party 
witnesses is a gap in theory and not merely an inconvenience to one wishing to apply 
his ideas to eviction hearings, for the same analysis applies to the criminal trial, the 
accepted archtype of the degradation ceremony in modern society. Here too most 
witnesses to the ceremony proper will not enter the accused's life space again. As 
many have noted (e.g., Lemert, 1951, 1967; Becker, 1963) and Schwartz and Skolnick 
(1962) have so nicely demonstrated, it is the label applied and the way knowledge of 
the label is disseminated which matters. No independent degrading effect may be at- 
tributed to a trial-type ceremony unless it changes the accused's conception of self 
apart from any postceremonial experience. 
The extension of Garfinkel's theory so that it applies to the criminal trial and the 
eviction hearing is straightforward. All one must postulate is that the process of iden- 
tity transformation has a psychological dimension. To key this extension to es- 
tablished theory one must merely note that the accused is not only the subject of the 
degradation ceremony, he is also a witness to it. Mead's (1934) conclusion that in- 
dividuals tend to see themselves as others see them and the symbolic interactionist 
ing action is evidenced by the fact that the law allows stringent penalties for nonconformity. The eviction 
board is clearly acting as a public body. To the extent it denounces it is doing so in the name of community 
values, board members are not redressing personal grievances, and, in its role of enforcer, the board sup- 
ports the values which have been violated. 
Even if moralizing means that all of Garfinkel's requisites for successful degradation are present and 
even if one fully accepts Garfinkers theoretical argument, one can only speak of a probability that the ten- 
ant will be degraded for Garfinkel introduces his conditions as necessary but not necessarily sufficient. 
There is, however, a certain circularity inherent in Garfinkel's analysis. Success is defined by transforming 
the witnesses' conception of the denounced person's social identity. Some of Garfinkel's conditions 
relating to the effects which the ceremony must have on witnesses almost amount to this. 
16To the extent that social status is the sum of what others think ]gf one, the accused's status by definition is 
degraded when his identity is degraded in the eyes of others. To the extent that social status reflects 
behavior, the accused's behavior can be expected to change so as to accord with a degraded status in 
response to the behavior of others who treat him as if he has such degraded status (Lemert, 1967). 
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conception of self which incorporates this conclusion suggest that a ceremony which 
can convince witnesses that an individual is of lower social status should have some 
power to convince the individual who witnesses both the ceremony and the reaction of 
other witnesses. 17 
Garfinkel's theory as extended would explain the apparently powerful effects 
which moralizing has in the eviction setting. However, the theory has never received 
the empirical grounding which would allow one to be confident that it can explain 
observed relationships. 18 The most one can say is that Garfinkel's ideas and the sym- 
bolic interactionist perspective provide a reasonable and theoretically consistent ex- 
planation of the data reported in this article. 
The possibility of certain atheoretical explanations must also be acknowledged. 
The observed relationship may be due to chance factors which affect the rent-paying 
ability of public-housing families. 19 The number of cases analyzed is not so large that 
one can be reasonably confident that such effects will cancel out. The chance 
hypothesis is rendered somewhat less plausible by the data supporting the prediction 
that moralized tenants would become recidivists closer to the time of the hearing than 
those not moralized, but even the implausible occasionally occurs. There is also the 
possibility that the relationships revealed may be spurious. There may be something 
about the tenant's personality or history which leads both to board moralizing and 
tenant failure. This is the situation which I expected to find when I examined the con- 
trolled relationships. The fact that none of the control variables alone or in combina- 
tion explains the outcomes attributable to moralizing suggests that the association 
between moralizing and outcome is not spurious, but the analysis is hampered by the 
small number of available cases. Although one may think of other control variables 
which might be applied, the ones used cover a large portion of the information 
available to the board during its dealings with the tenant. Demeanor, a crucial missing 
variable, is assumed to correlate highly with the tenant's history of trouble at the proj- 
ect level. If it does not, there is no apparent reason why it should correlate with the 
tenant's future inability to pay rent. 
III. C O N C L U S I O N  
This study is limited enough in scope that its findings must be taken as tentative. 
If replication demonstrates that these results hold in administrative settings similar to 
the eviction settings, the finding would have important practical implications. The 
eviction board, for example, might have tried cooling in techniques in all cases had 
they known that such techniques provide real aid to tenants. Steps might also be taken 
17Mead's (1934) perspective on the bifurcated self is a helpful way to think about this. When one is seeking 
to change psychic identity by degradation, he is trying to reach the accused's "me"  as a witness in the way 
he would try to reach other witnesses if he were seeking a change in social identity. If reached, the "me"  
can be expected to exert new controls over the " I"  just as external witnesses can be expected to exert new 
controls over the person if they are persuaded that he has a new and deviant identity. 
18From one perspective this study may be seen as a test of Garfinkel's, theory as extended. Tenants are 
divided naturally into two groups, those moralized and those not. Only where tenants are moralized are all 
of Garfinkers requisites for successful status degradation present. Where these requisites are present 
tenants later behave in accord with a degraded status much more than when they are not present. The data 
are consistent with the theory. 
I~I am thinking here of illness, theft, layoffs, marital problems, and the like, 
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to ensure that administrative adjudicators avoid moralizing in their interaction with 
those before them. 
Similar research on criminal trials would be particularly interesting. My results 
suggest that such research could lead to findings of both theoretical and practical im- 
portance. Treatment effects could be measured by such readily available statistics as 
parole revocation, rearrest, reconviction, or recommitment to an institution. In addi- 
tion, measures uncontaminated by the enforcement process could be developed for 
such things as attitudes toward the trial, adjustment to prison, or success on proba- 
tion. Treatment would be more difficult to measure, but this might be done effectively 
by systematic observation of trials over time. Subjective measures of treatment, re- 
quiring substantially less time, could be acquired by interrogating convicts. 
Even if the treatment effects reported in the eviction setting are real and strong, 
similar effects might not be found in the criminal justice setting since there are impor- 
tant differences between the two areas. One important difference is the nature of the 
confounding intervening experience. The only formal sanction which the housing 
board has is eviction and this has been withheld in the cases studied. The court, on the 
other hand, may apply a variety of sanctions; fines, suspended sentences, probation, 
and imprisonment. Informal judicial treatment as an independent variable may in- 
teract with the formal sanction imposed, so the effects of court treatment may vary 
with the formal sanctions they accompany. One would expect that the effects of court 
treatment would be most visible where formal sentences were relatively unintrusive, as 
is the case with suspended sentences, unsupervised probation, and fines. However, 
even in these instances the dissemination of the label "convict" might have 
criminogenic effects which would outweigh or disguise effects attributable to court 
treatment. 
There is also a basic difference in what eviction boards and courts are trying to 
do. The board is trying to get the tenant to do something he has not been doing, i.e., 
pay his rent. The court is trying to get the convict to refrain from doing something he 
has been doing, i.e., committing crimes. This difference may have important im- 
plications for the effects of informal judicial treatment. Cooling in, for example, 
might be much more effective when it is directed toward a specific goal such as paying 
rent than when it is directed toward a diffuse goal such as staying out of troubJe. 
Degradation effects, on the other hand, might'be more pronounced with respect to a 
particular goal when the thrust of the denouncement is directed to the ability of the 
one denounced to accomplish that goal than when it is directed at total moral 
character. In measuring such differences, it is necessary to control for effects that 
arise from the dissemination of the label deviant. In the housing setting it appears that 
very little stigma is associated with having been brought before the eviction board; in 
the criminal justice setting substantial stigma attaches to one's having been brought 
before a court, even where the result is an acquittal (Schwartz & Skolnick, 1962). 
Finally, it is possible that degradation ceremonies will be accompanied by im- 
mediate psychological effects only where those subject to them bear some allegiance 
to the norm which they have allegedly violated3 ~ Most tenants, if asked, would admit 
the legitimacy of the requirement that they pay rent. "Criminals are likely to differ 
2~ the language of Mead and Garfinkel, there may be no value in reaching the subject's "me" as a witness 
unless it can be convinced that it differs from the subject's ' T '  in the same way that the denouncer tries to 
emphasize his and the community's distance from the subject denounced. 
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markedly in the legitimacy which they ascribe to the norms whose commands they 
have violated. If this is so, one can test the interesting prediction that there will be a 
direct relationship between the detrimental effects of degradation ceremonies on 
character and the extent to which the defendant ascribes legitimacy to the norm he is 
accused of violating. Ironically, those processes by which society labels its deviants 
may have their greatest potential for negative impact on individuals who initially are 
least disaffected from the prevailing normative structure. 
Because of the differences between the eviction hearing and the criminal trial, a 
failure to replicate the results reported here would not necessarily mean that the 
effects associated with moralizing and cooling in will not apply in some spheres. 
However, a failure of replication would make it more likely that the relationships I 
have found are an artifact of chance or of some unexamined variables. Even if this 
were not the case, the theoretical and practical utility of these findings would be 
limited if the results could not be generalized to the criminal justice setting. 21 
REFERENCES 
Becker, H. S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press, 1963. 
Duncan, O. D. A sociometric index for all occupations. In Reiss, A. J., Hatt, P. K., & North, C. C. (Eds). 
Occupations and Social Status. New York: Free Press, 1961. 
Emerson, R. M. Judging Delinquents. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. 
Garfinkel, H. Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies. American Journal of Sociology, 1956, 16, 
420-424. 
Goffman, E. On cooling the mark out. Psychiatry, 1952, 15, 451-463. 
Goldberger, A. S. Econometric Theory. New York: Wiley, 1964. 
Kinch, J. W. A formalized theory of the self-concept. American Journal of Sociology, 1963, 68, 481-486. 
Lemert, E. M. Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1967. 
Lemert, E. M. Social Pathology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951. 
Lempert, R. O. Evictions from public housing: A sociological inquiry. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 1971. 
McPartland, T. S., Cummings, J. H., & Garretson, W. S. Self-conception and word behavior in two 
psychiatric hospitals. Sociometry, 1961, 24, 111-124. 
Mead, G. H. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
Mileski, M. Courtroom encounters: An observation study of a lower criminal court. Law and Society 
Review, 1971, 5, 473-536. 
Schwartz, R. & Skolnick, J. Two studies of legal stigma. Social Problems, 1962, 10, 133-142. 
Videbeck, R. Self-conception and the reaction of others. Sociometry, 1960, 23, 351-359. 
Webster, M., Roberts, L., & Sobieszak, B. I. Accepting "significant others": Six models. American 
Journal of Sociology, 1972, 78, 576-598. 
Wheeler, S., Bonacich, E., Cramer, M. R., & Zola, I. S. Agents of delinquency control: A comparative 
analysis. In Wheeler, S. (Ed). Controlling Delinquents. New York: Wiley, 1968. 
21If the results of this study could not be generalized to the criminal courts but did apply to less formal ad- 
ministrative hearings, the practical implications of this research would still be great; many important 
benefits are, in the first instance, handed out or withdrawn by administrative agencies. 
